3 overfishing or otherwise. 10 Increasing human activities on land arising from the need to service the new Arctic industries may also affect the marine environment through, for example landbased pollution.
These threats potentially provide the EU with fertile ground for action, but some of the international regimes that the EU could influence are likely to provide more fruitful locations for its efforts than others. For example, while the main focus of action vis à vis climate change will be the global climate change regime, 11 the likelihood of success in influencing the development of aspects of the climate change regime to specifically protect marine biodiversity in the Arctic is quite slim. The EU might wish to promote an agreement to minimize the impact of climate change mitigation measures on Arctic marine biodiversity -a specialized version of the Marrakesh Accords 12 -but not only might this in effect duplicate an existing agreement, it would also require a considerable expenditure of political capital for a very uncertain return.
Similarly, addressing marine pollution from land-based activities requires significant interference with the domestic sovereignty of Arctic States. One option might be to support the existing Arctic regional plan of action on marine pollution from land-based activities (RPA).
For example, the EU could provide funding or scientific support for particular projects under the RPA. The ability of the EU to do so is, however, heavily dependent upon the willingness of the Arctic States to cooperate. A better option may be for the EU to focus on a particular aspect of marine pollution from land-based activities, such as pollution from heavy metals, or marine debris and promote a global agreement 13 in that area akin to the persistent organic pollutants 14 and mercury conventions. 15 In the absence of such a possible area of focus, the likelihood of the EU's actions having significant impact in relation to the protection of Arctic biodiversity from this source of pollution is likely to be limited. The potential difficulties in obtaining agreement in these areas suggest that the EU should focus upon other areas. Possible areas of focus are the global biodiversity regime, shipping, fisheries and offshore oil and gas operations. It is believed by the authors that these are fruitful areas for EU action. Not only have shipping, fisheries and oil and gas been identified as major emerging challenges for Arctic marine biodiversity, 16 but the EU either has exclusive competence in policy making (fisheries), 17 or successful experience of influencing international decision-making in the past decade (shipping). 18 This article therefore provides a roadmap for possible EU action in these areas. Firstly the EU's competence in the Arctic is briefly introduced. Then the discussion turns to the EU's potential external and internal actions in shipping, fisheries and offshore oil and 
The EU's Competence 21 in the Arctic
By any account the EU is a relatively new player in the Arctic. 22 The EU has been described by some as the most dramatic case a non-Arctic organization that asserts claims to be treated as a legitimate stakeholder with regard to Arctic issues. 23 While it is true that no EU Member 21 Competence is the term used in the Lisbon Treaty to describe the power the EU has to draw up policies and laws. The EU may introduce policies and laws only in relation to those areas that are set out in the treaties. The competences of the EU are divided into three categories: 1) the EU has exclusive competence (Art. 3 TFEU) (only the EU can act); 2) competences are shared between the EU and the member states (Art. 4 TFEU) (The member states can act only if the EU has chosen not to); 3) the EU has competence to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the member states (Art. 6 TFEU) -in these areas, the EU may not adopt legally binding acts that require the member states to harmonise their laws and regulations. Given that the EU has been granted the power to act in these areas by its Member States, the real question then is, how can the EU exercise these powers to the benefit of Arctic marine biodiversity.
The EU and Arctic Shipping
As shipping seasons extend, Arctic shipping costs are reduced and point-to-point demand increases, Arctic maritime traffic is expected to increase. 
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There is, therefore, a need for action to mitigate these impacts, so how might this be done?
The UNCLOS provides the framework for the regulation of all maritime shipping There may also be a need to develop some of the issues not addressed in the code such as polar specific ballast water standards. Any further laws in relation to shipping will be developed through the IMO. If the EU is to influence the development of laws 52 It means that the body which adopts the amendment to an annex by a majority vote, at the same time fixes the entry into force and the time period within which the contracting parties will have the opportunity to notify their rejection of the amendment, or to remain silent on the subject. A decision taken by a majority will be binding for states that did not support the decision, unless they explicitly opt out within the time period foreseen. In case of silence, the amendment is considered to have been accepted by the party. 
13
in this area it needs to be able to influence the IMO's work even though it is not a member of the IMO. In fact, this ought not to prove problematic for the EU as it has already influenced the international decision making process for preventing vessel source pollution in the past decade.
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The In addition, as an economic power and potential destination for trans-Arctic shipping, the EU could take action internally which could have a significant impact on Arctic shipping. It "a moderate warming will improve the conditions for some of the most important commercial fish stocks. This is most likely to be due to enhanced levels of primary and secondary production resulting from reduced sea-ice cover and more extensive habitat areas for subarctic species such as cod and herring".
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The impact of current and future fisheries on the marine environment and marine biodiversity in the Arctic is not likely to be fundamentally different from impacts to the marine environment and biodiversity in other parts of the globe. 66 Across the globe we see that marine capture fisheries are generally at or exceeding the limits of sustainable fisheries. The declining global marine catch over the last few years together with the increased percentage of overexploited fish stocks and the decreased proportion of non-fully exploited species around the world convey a strong message that the state of the world's marine fisheries is worsening and that this has had a negative impact on fishery production. 67 This impact on fisheries production combined with the physical harm caused by the, often highly destructive, methods given that it does not rely on the ability of the EU to persuade other actors to join its action or share its views, port State action may well prove to be a more fruitful course of action than any of the other options considered here.
The EU and Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Operations
The Arctic contains vast oil and natural gas reserves -the U.S. Geological Survey estimates the Arctic could contain 1,670 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas and 90 billion barrels of oil, or 30 per cent of the world's undiscovered gas and 13 per cent of oil. 101 Climate change is gradually making access to the Arctic marine area easier, and as such, offshore hydrocarbon exploitation is anticipated to be a major future economic activity in the Arctic. 102 As long as the world economy is dependent on oil and gas, the extraction of oil and gas in the Arctic seems and its 1996 Protocol. 109 And once again these agreements do not provide a comprehensive regulatory regime for the Arctic. 110 There are many gaps, for example the regulation on the construction of artificial islands is somewhat limited, as is the international regulation of noise pollution. 111 As with shipping, specific standards are likely to be required in the Arctic to protect it from the dangers posed by extractive industries.
To some extent Arctic specific standards do exist. The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) 112 deals with prevention and elimination of pollution from offshore sources in Annex III and its range extends throughout the North-East Atlantic. It is concerned with the prevention and elimination of pollutants as well as ensuring sustainable use of the sea. 113 However, OSPAR only covers part of the Arctic Ocean. 114 Similarly two instruments have been adopted that specifically address offshore oil and gas extraction in the Arctic. Firstly the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines 115 propose a non-binding set of suggested best practices for oil and gas extraction designed to advise industry officials and government regulators. 116 Secondly, the Agreement on Cooperation on
Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic 117 was adopted under the auspices of the Arctic Council in 2013 (though it has yet to enter into force).
This scenario provides a similar opportunity for the EU to those described in relation to both shipping and fisheries. The EU indeed has no territorial jurisdiction on offshore oil and gas operations in national waters of Arctic States. However, as a major consumer, importer and technology provider of energy and raw materials, the EU is becoming an emerging actor in global energy politics 118 and it is one with an interest in the resource policy development in the shelf, an international agreement would provide industry with a standard to meet, regardless of where in the world it was drilling. 123 However, even if an international convention on offshore drilling could be adopted in the foreseeable future, it may not be that meaningful for the Arctic.
A global convention has to allow for compromises between different interests from around the world; as such it may not be able to pay too much attention to the Arctic. It is therefore suggested that the EU should make efforts to promote an Arctic-specific legally binding agreement on offshore oil and gas operations, containing the highest safety standards. As noted earlier, non-binding Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines have already been published by the PAME of the Arctic Council. These Guidelines could possibly become a starting point, or the basis for proposals from the EU.
The EU is aware of the fact that existing legislation and industry practices within the EU "the existing divergent and fragmented regulatory framework applying to safety of offshore oil and gas operations in the Union and current industry safety practices do not provide a fully adequate assurance that the risk of offshore accidents is minimised throughout the Union, and that in the event of an accident occurring in offshore waters of Member States, the most effective response would be deployed in a timely manner".
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While the lack of an EU/Arctic coastline minimises the potential impact of any EU efforts to address these weaknesses, the establishment of minimum requirements for preventing major accidents and limiting the consequences of such accidents within the EU 126 could be used as a model for similar Arctic requirements through the Arctic Council. 130 Europe to Get its First EU-wide Offshore Oil and Gas Law, http://www.euractiv.com/energy/europe-get-eu-wide-offshoreoil-news-518002.
131 On the role of industry in supporting or undermining developments in marine governance see Kirk n. 92 above.
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Cross Sector Actions
The routes to EU influence that have been discussed so far have focused on sector specific activities. These sectors were chosen as the starting point for the discussion in part because it was relatively easy to show the EU's interest in two of them -fishing and shipping -and to show the possible routes to action regardless of the EU's status as a recognized Arctic actor or otherwise in all of them. In this last section we consider actions that cut across sectors, specifically the adoption of ecosystem-based management approaches and the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs). Here, the ability of the EU to act may depend a little more on being able to prove its interests in the Arctic. It has no Member States with Arctic coastlines, but the interests it has in fisheries, in particular in relation to high seas fisheries, and shipping and the offshore extractive industries in the Arctic discussed above, together with its commitment to protect biological diversity point to good reason for it to act under the framework of the CBD.
Motivation for cross-sector action comes from the fact that the complexity inherent in the marine environment, with its high biophysical dynamics, biological diversity and ecological interaction, combined with the common pool characteristics of marine resources, point to the need for an integrated approach to management to be taken. 132 The European Commission has already proposed the exploration of "the possibility of establishing new, multi-sector frameworks for integrated ecosystem management. 133 One such possibility is to build upon the ecosystem approach, which is already partially recognized within the laws on marine worth recalling once again that the Arctic Council is a "soft law organization". As such the EU may wish to pursue action that is more likely to lead to a binding agreement.
As a party to the CBD under the so-called "regional economic integration organizations" (REIO) clause, 143 the EU could pursue the adoption of further measures there, particularly measures focused on the application of the ecosystem approach to the marine environment, though it may be harder to obtain Arctic specific measures on the use of the ecosystem approach within the CBD.
In addition to pursuing the development of the application of the ecosystem approach, the EU could potentially address the adoption of marine protected areas in the Arctic. Protected areas have been described by the CBD as an important means to achieve conservation gains. 
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protected areas apply, or at least appear to apply within State jurisdiction only. 148 The most obvious regime to consider as an alternative to the CBD is, of course, UNCLOS. There is, however, a potential problem with relying upon UNCLOS. It makes no reference to biodiversity, especially in areas beyond national jurisdiction, though Art.194 (5) does require parties to take measures necessary 'to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life', 149 providing an inroad for action. The lack of a regime addressing biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction has already been identified by the international community and, during the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), states committed, on an urgent basis, to addressing the issue. The agreement to act included a commitment to taking a decision on the development of an international instrument under UNCLOS, before the end of the sixtyninth session of the UN General Assembly to address biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 150 It is worth noting that the working group that led to this initiative specifically recommended that the process to establish a legal framework include within its discussion measures such as area-based management tools, including marine protected areas. 151 The EU, as a contracting party of UNCLOS, has been a strong supporter of the development of a new implementing agreement under UNCLOS on this topic. 152 If the new implementing protocol can be adopted in the foreseeable future, it will provide a solid legal basis for the establishment of marine protected areas in the Arctic high seas, particularly in the central Arctic Ocean. As a distant water fishing entity which is likely to see its vessels move into the central Arctic Ocean high seas area, the EU would be well placed to push for the establishment of an MPA there, if not in the other Arctic high seas enclaves. In the meantime the negotiations of this instrument provide the EU with an opportunity for action. It is suggested that the EU should keep working towards the adoption of this new implementing protocol. As a member of the CBD, it is also in a position to promote a cross-sector MPA around the North Pole within the CBD regime and it may use the coordination process discussed earlier to pursue agreement through the Arctic Council for a programme of measures aimed at the establishment of an MPA in the central Arctic Ocean, if not more widely within the Arctic waters.
Conclusions
Arctic marine biodiversity is under threat as a result of the possibility of increased human activities in the Arctic, following the impacts of climate change on Arctic ice. Although there is a comprehensive international legal regime applicable to the marine Arctic, gaps do exist for the protection of marine biodiversity in the Arctic. The EU, as a major actor in international environmental politics and decision-making, has competence to take initiatives to improve the current legal regime.
This paper has outlined a number of potential ways in which the EU may be able to play an influential role. In doing so it has highlighted the fact that the EU's chances of successfully taking measures to protect Arctic marine biodiversity are higher than one might initially anticipate, given that its status as an Arctic actor is often times in question by Arctic States. It has also highlighted the fact that the greatest opportunities for successful action may not lie in the most immediately obvious locations. Thus one might anticipate that the EU should push for observer status within the Arctic Council to be able to influence decision-making there, or that it should pursue action under the CBD, or climate change regimes. It is, however, likely to prove extremely difficult to get agreement on Arctic specific measures in either the CBD or climate change regime, and the possibility of usefully influencing the development of agreements within the Arctic Council seem somewhat slight. There are, however, alternative options and chief amongst these in terms of likely success is the adoption of internal measures to regulate shipping, extractive industries or fisheries in the Arctic. That is not to say that action within the CBD or elsewhere should be written off completely, simply that, as the chances of success are less certain, they may not be the best places to start.
